Here is a review:
2019.12.01, Notre Dame University
STEFAN SIENKIEWICZ
Five Modes of Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus and the Agrippan Modes
Reviewed by Richard Bett, Johns Hopkins University
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/five-modes-of-scepticism-sextus-empiricus-and-the-agrippan-modes/
Now, I didn't get very far, but I did get to the point in the discussion of diaphonia or discord where we have a school divergence between The Conciliatory and The Steadfast.
I believe sth. I then find out that there are equal grounds (of fact and logic) against it as I already knew for it. I am not sure this case ever occurs, but for Sextus Empiricus it does, and obviously anyone in Sextus Empiricus' school would agree that in this case I should suspend my judgement.
Now, there is another case, where the Sceptic school is (not sure if under Antiquity or more recently) divided: I believe sth to be proven. I then find out someone of equal authority to myself believes the opposite is proven.
Should I suspend my judgement?
First of all, we are dealing with a discussion of the philosophy known as Scepticism, an epistemology different from Platonian and Aristotelic and even Stoic dogmatism and also different from Xenophantic or Xenophanean total agnosticism, or strong agnosticism. So, as Christianity is closer to Plato and Aristotle than to Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic answer may not oblige me.
But in fact, there is not one sceptic answer to this one, but two. The one school is called "The Steadfast" and the other "The Conciliatory".
The Conciliatory reasons:
- i. In this question Subject 1 (in this case myself) and Subject 2 are of equal epistemic proficiency, equally familiar with the facts, equally good logicians, and come to opposed conclusions.
- ij. Whenever on whatever subject Subject 1 and Subject 2 are of equal epistemic value and they arrive at opposed conclusions, there is insufficient reasons to chose one over the other and one should suspend judgement.
- iij. In this question, I should therefore suspend judgement.
The Steadfast refutes this by claiming that ij. is an invalid principle. If he has no more proof against his position than someone his epistemic equal thinking the opposite, he should stick to it.
And if The Conciliatory were to insist, he would refute himself by - once he knows the position of The Steadfast - behaving like The Steadfast.
The Conciliatory can therefore only insist in a limited perspective, if ij. in his reasoning is not universally valid but only valid for the kind of subject he is investigating.
Which brings one to the question - here I am reasoning on after having to stop reading on - what would the principle behind a limited acceptance of ij. be?
Now, there is one category of people who seem, to me, to have behaved as if they insisted on me having a duty to behave like The Conciliatry, or perhaps even to recognise "Subject 2" as being my epistemic superior. And therefore a duty to short circuit any reasoning about the facts or the logic with a deference to an epistemic superior.
More than one of them could be involved with shrinks, but more than one of them would also have another motive. They would be sure the Evolutionists comprise people my epistemic superiors where I am Creationist. They would be sure the Heliocentrics do so when I am Geocentric, and they would be sure some Theologian could disprove my contention that Catholicism is epistemically vastly superior to Protestantism, and that Protestantism is in fact self refuting.
I do not think people should measure each other as epistemic superiors or inferiors on a lifelong basis (a learner would in some sense be an epistemic inferior to the one he's learning under, but the goal is to reach a point of epistemic equality in mastering the subject). I also do not think who is epistemically superior to whom is more important than facts and logic. Even Catholicism and Protestantism : Richard Fangrad is epistemically inferior to Catholicism, since we know and he doesn't know on what basis Bible verses with different interpretations should in general be decided, namely on tradition and magisterial decision, but this does not leave him with a duty to abandon Young Earth Creationism as soon as he meets a would be representative of Catholicism telling him (wrongly) that Catholicism does not encourage Young Earth Creationism.
He would be perfectly right to conclude that that Catholic were epistemically his inferior if the Catholic thought he had a reason in Tradition, in Church Fathers, to treat Genesis 1 to 11 as non-historic and as having only a Sensus Allegoricus. Because that Catholic would in fact be ignorant of what Catholicism means by Sensus Litteralis and Sensus Allegoricus, and also wrong to believe Tradition assigns to Genesis 1 to 11 only a Sensus Allegoricus but no Sensus Litteralis or no factual truth in that Sensus. That Catholic would have been told and would have believed a very garbled version of what the Four Senses actually mean, and a Catholic badly instructed in Catholicism is not necessarily epistemically superior to a Protestant. Indeed, the Protestant is only Christian by being Catholic (baptised, believing in Christ) and only heretic by being badly instructed. So, the badly instructed Catholic is his epistemic equal where the instruction is bad, or even, in some cases, his epistemic inferior.
This doesn't in the least change the fact that Richard Fangrad has a god-given duty to come to terms with the Catholic sense of the Bible, to believe Seven Sacraments, to believe the Eucharist is a Sacrifice and includes the Real Presence, to believe we have free will and God's election will not simply override any use we make of it, unless he believes this last point already and already came to terms with it, to believe there is a magisterium instituted by Christ, which gained assistance from the Holy Spirit on Pentecost Day, and that the consensus over past representatives of this magisterium, Popes and Bishops, or of people approved by it (St. Ephrem the Syrian was a Deacon, St. Justin Martyr a layman) in their capacity as writers is obliging as to how we interpret Scripture.
I do not therefore need to consider me as epistemic inferior to a Catholic priest. He is obliged to know Theology, but I have a right to learn it if interested, which was my case, and sometimes, in debates on Theology, it can be a layman who rebukes a priest, like the first one to call out "heresy" when Nestorius denied Theotokos, was precisely a layman in his Cathedral of Hagia Sophia where he was at the time Ecumenic Patriarch or rather Patriarch (the title "Ecumenic Patriarch" is later). My learning from interest may be superior to his learning from duty. Provided obviously I looked into the sources recommended by the Catholic Church, this not being "Bible alone" but Bible, Fathers, Scholastics and of course also infallible decrees by the Magisterium.
Hans Georg Lundahl
Bpi, Georges Pompidou
II Lord's Day of Lent
8.III.2020
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