Wednesday, 4 March 2015

A Specious Argument for Not Resisting Psychiatry in Any Way

1) Some Foul Uses of Psychiatry, 2) A Specious Argument for Not Resisting Psychiatry in Any Way

There are arguments of prudential type against stupid ways. But if psychiatry becomes too powerful in someone's life, so that all ways are stupid, in the end none are really stupid, because no more stupid than the rest.

But here we were talking about a specious argument against resisting psychiatry in ANY way:

  • St Paul says : [Ephesians 6]:[5] Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ: [6] Not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but, as the servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart, [7] With a good will serving, as to the Lord, and not to men. And St Peter says [II Peter 2]:[18] Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. [19] For this is thankworthy, if for conscience towards God, a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully. [20] For what glory is it, if committing sin, and being buffeted for it, you endure? But if doing well you suffer patiently; this is thankworthy before God.

  • [But, as it is usually unstated, I give two versions: psychiatrists are the lords of the patients or, if patients consider they are object of slave hunt, then it would follow that the psychiatrists are their lords.]

  • Therefore the patients [or those who consider psychiatry a form of slavery] are obliged to be obedient to the psychiatrists as lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling. And they should obey even the froward like that.


So far the argument.

Now, to the problem. Or problems.

One of them is this: if I had been born - which was not the case - to a mother raised in slavery and myself being raised in it to, if I had received both good and bad things of my childhood from the man my mother had called master, and so on, I might have a certain duty to consider him and his successors as my lawful masters. And therefore the good Latin word for such a man would be "dominus" and the good English word would be "lord".

However, I was raised in freedom, with my mother (at least most of the time) in freedom. At a certain point, someone starts wanting me to obey his orders. Or lays siege to my liberties. Takes careful note of all my habits, as far as he can get at them, and starts arranging behind my back that one after the other of them shall be less and less rentable, so I shall be more and more "motivated" to come when he beckons, to obey his instructions, to be in certain ways as subject to him as if I were his slave.

Do I owe him the obediences which St Paul and St Peter say that slaves owe masters or servants owe lords? No.

One man claiming to have me for a slave does not make me lawfully such.

Asking me to obey him because he wants to be obeyed by me, is like asking France to lay down arms because Daesh has declared that France is Dar-el-Harb. Or like asking France to obey Hitler as soon as he walks in.

France obeyed Hitler in part, but only after a capitulation had been signed. I have not signed a capitulation to psychiatry, I do not know why I should consider their doctors or other personnel as lawfully my masters or lords, nor why I should consider myself as lawfully their servant or slave.

In other words, citing Ephesians 6 or II Peter 2 as prooftext by anyone thinking or knowing me to have a diagnosis that I should submit to psychiatry is stupid.

You see, St Paul also says a few things more: [I Cor. 7]:[21] Wast thou called, being a bondman? care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. [22] For he that is called in the Lord, being a bondman, is the freeman of the Lord. Likewise he that is called, being free, is the bondman of Christ. [23] You are bought with a price; be not made the bondslaves of men.

So, I am not intended to give up the freedom which is lawfully mine.

Of course, if I commit a crime, it is just that I go to prison. So, from after getting caught, to judgement, from condemnation to a legal release from prison, I would be in a sense a bondslave of men, and accepting the just penalty according to its terms would be just of me. But only according to its terms, not ten years or more after getting released. And even in prison, not to meaningless humiliations.

One way in which psychiatry is illicit slave hunt is that it shuts people up for things that are not crimes, on the theory they are anyway autodestructive. Well, in five cases out of fifty, perhaps they really are.

But another way is that, if instead of prison you get psychiatry, your penalty will not be in proportion to your crime.

From shrinks, a killer can get out as soon as shrinks think him cured (and as soon as they have convinced a judge of it - in some cases they will tell their patient that can never happen. But) take a bar brawl and the killer will be out as soon as shrinks can convince judges he's good at avoiding bars and brawls. Even if that is considerably less than the years that a non-premeditated manslaughter would get. From shrinks also, a man who would get a few months for mistreating his girl friend with one or two boxes can get a couple of years. By shrinks also, persons charged with arson can be threatened they will get treated and treated longer if they deny the charge. I know one person who admitted under duress. But if shrinks are expert at evaluating what goes on in a mind, can't they at least tell if a man is lying or telling the truth?

Apparently not. A man who has been charged with cannibalism (combined with homosexual pederasty) and who was locked up with shrinks admitted during therapy several charges, got condemned a few times over, and finally made one or two admissions which the shrinks accepted but the persons knowing the case scrapped, as contradicting known details about the victims or times or cases. He is now a free man. Whether he was guilty once is a moot point, according to the judges at present that is not the case. What is certain is that of two occasions at least once the shrinks were severely wrong about him - either when finally accepting he had had false memories - or when accepting previous to that his confessions as true, if they weren't.

So, neither a shrink bumping into the life of an innocent person nor a shrink bumping into the life of a condemned criminal is sufficient cause for him to obey a shrink. The condemned criminal should obey prison facilities, with measure, he should not be made to obey shrinks.

This brings us to the other problem of shrinks being treated as equivalents of masters in this biblical sense. Masters have limited powers.

Supplement to the Third Part, Question 52 on Impediment of slavery, Article 2. Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?

Objection 1. It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master's consent. For no one can give a person that which is another's without the latter's consent. Now a slave is his master's chattel. Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by marrying without his master's consent.

Objection 2. Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot marry without his consent.

Objection 3. Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master's consent, the latter would be deprived of a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.

Objection 4. Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter's wife is unable to follow him, through either bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry without his master's consent.

Objection 5. Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master's consent. Much less therefore can he be married without his consent.

On the contrary, "In Christ Jesus . . . there is neither bond nor free" (Galatians 3:26-28). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.

Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master's consent.

I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his master's knowledge or consent.

Reply to Objection 1. A slave is his master's chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master's consent.

Reply to Objection 2. A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not bound to obey his master.

Reply to Objection 3. If a slave has married with his master's consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave's marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the marriage was contracted without the master's knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference to obey his master, if the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife's chastity is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations, all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his master or his wife.

Reply to Objection 4. In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.

Reply to Objection 5. By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without his master's consent.


But shrinks claim among other things the powers to stop marriages from happening, to help "Church" (or Vatican II pervesion of it) annul marriages by claiming "mental deficiency" at time of marriage, and so on. I e, shrinks claim more powers than masters have, also as to eating, drinking, sleeping. Therefore, not only is the start of their claims fudgy, but the edges of their power, unlike that of masters under Christendom's legal customs, back in days when some countries had slaves, are also fudgy in the extreme. Note, back when St Thomas wrote this in France, France (with Germany, Austria, Swittzerland, Benelux) no longer had slaves since Merovingian Francia under Queen St. Bathilde, but some parts of Italy where he came from, possibly and some parts of Spain or Portugal recently liberated from Moors, possibly had slaves. He was writing for such cases.

However, mental deficiency to the extent of actual madness or idiocy is a real impediment to marriage. So, isn't that why shrinks can impede them? No. Not when fifty patients are locked up where only five should be so. Not when "mentally disturbed" and even "psychotic" covers so many more and diverse things than "madness" used to do. See previous message on the topic.

So, if Ephesians 6 and II Peter 2 do not tell us how to act to shrinks, then "masters" or "lords" or "domini" is not the Biblical word for them. What is then the Biblical word?

1 Timothy 1: [9] Knowing this, that the law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust and disobedient, for the ungodly, and for sinners, for the wicked and defiled, for murderers of fathers, and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, [10] For fornicators, for them who defile themselves with mankind, for menstealers, for liars, for perjured persons, and whatever other thing is contrary to sound doctrine, [11] Which is according to the gospel of the glory of the blessed God, which hath been committed to my trust.

In other words, I think the English Biblical term for shrinks (as they are now, when locking up fifty patients of every five madmen), is "menstealers", and in Latin in this context "plagiariis". Ephesians 6 and II Peter 2 said something about obeying in fear "lords" but not a thing about obeying "menstealers". I think shrinks are thus enumerated among murderers and sodomites. And as a thing which is contrary to sound doctrine.

It is true that no madman considers himself a madman. But it is also true no madman considers himself sane. A madman is a person who cannot pose the question. If you can pose the question, and the shrink wants your liberty, you know he is intruding.

Hans Georg Lundahl
Nanterre UL
St Casimir of Vilnius
Confessor
4-III-2015

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